Introduction
Since 1990, the third wave of democratisation (Huntington, 1991) has swept across Africa, ending the continent with democratic institutions. In the meantime, driven by this impetus for democratisation, many have advocated for local governments to be granted autonomous status. Central governments are often too large to adequately address smaller questions or issues, such as the most pressing needs of cities and regions (Bell, 1976). One of the primary objectives of decentralisation reforms is to create a space for democracy within subnational territorial entities. The challenge of local democracy lies in enabling citizens to enjoy freedoms and actively participate in territorial governance. This concept of decentralisation refers to the ‘shift of authority (fiscal, political, administrative) from the centre to regional or local government within the country’ (Hooghe, L., Marks, G., and Schakel, A.H., 2023). Local elected representatives, chosen by their constituents, would be directly accountable to them. The demand for political responsibility fuels this vision of ‘accountability’ (Lonsdale 1986: 131). Thus, democracy and accountability serve as the driving force behind this transfer. Similarly, Alexis de Tocqueville, reflecting on the American experience, perceives the local system as the environment where democracy is nurtured. ‘Local institutions are to liberty what primary schools are to science. They bring it within the reach of the people; they give them a taste of how to use it peacefully and accustom them to using it. Without communal institutions, a nation can establish a free government, but it does not possess the spirit of liberty,’ he argues (Tocqueville 1835: 112-113).
Decentralisation, from the central state to non-central regions, also brings governance closer to the people, as noted by Mills, Montesquieu, and Tocqueville (Faguet 2014). The central government seeks to address the crisis of representativeness by involving the population more closely in managing their locality across all levels of sub-national governance. Furthermore, in a country with a diverse ethnicity, where identity shapes the collective imagination, central power is sometimes rejected by communities or ethnic groups that feel sidelined. In Europe, countries like Belgium, the United Kingdom, and Spain have grappled with the fragility of national institutions in the context of multiethnicity. Similarly, in Africa, with its diverse array of communities and tribes, decentralisation enables these groups to participate in public affairs and cultivates a sense of belonging to the political community.
Nonetheless, the reform of territorial administration, adorned with all the virtues of democracy, has not realised the optimistic vision of its advocates. Consequently, contrary to the wishes of the decentralisation initiators, ordinary citizens do not engage in local government due to a lack of ‘capital’, as defined by Bourdieu. Some urban elites and businesspeople have returned to their villages or localities to dominate the new grassroots political institutions (Metodjo 2008). Moreover, constituents face a lack of substantial representation. Given these circumstances, how can we centre ordinary citizens in local development and ensure they have a voice in decisions that affect their lives? What challenges do local governments encounter, and how can we address these, alongside the potential trajectory for the future? In the development that follows, we will explain how the surge in the youth population and urbanisation is creating significant challenges for local authorities, as well as why the improvement of living standards is essential. Furthermore, there is a need to reshape territorial public innovation by placing citizens at the forefront. Finally, we will elaborate on the impact of this strategy on local life.
1. The challenges of urban growth and youth
The fine-grained knowledge presented by Worldometers shows the significant figures for the African population. The total number of inhabitants exceeds 1.5 billion, according to the United Nations metrics. Africans, therefore, account for 18.3% of the world’s population, making them the second most populous continent. Other details of the data are the media age of 19.2, while 44.5% of the population lives in urban areas.
According to United Nations figures, it is estimated that this year, around 75% of Africa’s population will be under 35, 70% under 30 and 60% under 25. The ‘demographic transition’ in Africa shows that birth rates are slowly falling while life expectancy is rising, meaning that a greater proportion of the population is reaching working age, with the demographic dividend. The United Nations predicts that Africa’s population will double by 2070 to 3 billion, compared with 1.5 billion in 2025 and 2.5 billion in 2050.
Africa’s population will double by 2070 to 3 billion, compared with 1.5 billion in 2025 and 2.5 billion in 2050.
By 2050, projections indicate that over 70% of the population will live in cities. Today, 70% of South Africans are urban dwellers, including 56% of Nigerians and 92% of Gabonese, compared with 18% of Rwandans, 17% of Nigeriens and 24% of Ethiopians. Ourworldindata gives us an overall view of the situation in Africa, country by country. Scant evidence of this explosion poses major challenges for local authorities in terms of urban planning and infrastructures, access to education and healthcare, increasing the workforce and the effects of climate change: drought, flood, and food insecurity.
Even Africa is still waiting for more climate justice (Gripps 2002) and concrete measures to tackle the evils mentioned above, the limited economic opportunities and the famine ravaging the countryside causing an exodus and crime, not to mention terrorism wreaking havoc in Africa, chiefly in the Sahel region. In urban areas, how do we deal with cornubation and its corollaries, as well as issues of quality of life, the environment, housing, water and safety? These challenges have created other problems, such as basic social services, that have yet to be resolved.
Onistha, the third largest metropolitan area on the African continent, is located on the left bank of the Niger, in Eastern Nigeria, with a population of 8.5 million. Its effective surface area will be 80 times greater than its administrative boundaries (Hugonin 2024). The town was a traditional Igbo society that was transformed into a commercial centre. Over time, it expanded with migrant traders, and the problems of housing, security, and pollution became insurmountable. Onitsha is the epitome of poor urban planning and all the problems described above. Once a luxurious and prosperous town, the area is now the result of the pressure of urbanisation that developed during the land acquisition process. Innocent Franklin Makata asserted that ‘Housing shortages and the proliferation of informal settlements exacerbates these issues, alongside environmental impacts like flooding and waste management challenges’ (Makata 2024). How can citizens make ends meet? It is important to improve people’s standard of living. How can we support Sustainable Development Goal 11: to ensure that cities and human settlements are inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable? As noted by the United Nations, the Young People’s Potential is the Key to Africa’s Sustainable Development: “It is especially important that young people are included in decision making and given appropriate opportunities for work and to innovate”.
2. Citizenship crisis in Africa
Against this backdrop of governance, citizens are experiencing a great deal of frustration. Citizenship is ‘legal membership in a state, typically giving full access to privileges available to other inhabitants’ (Parsons, 2017: 105). It’s seen as a ‘status bestowed on those who are full members of a community’, with a set of rights and obligations. (Marshall 1950: 28). Traditionally, citizenship implies three sorts of rights: civil rights, political rights, and social rights (Marshall, 1973). From denial of rights to lack of substantive representation and belonging, Africa is going through a citizenship crisis (See Fawole and Ukeje 2005; Banegas and Cutolo 2024). ‘A democracy can’t be strong if its citizenship is weak,’ thinks William A. Galston (2011).
Thus, Africans have lost faith in democracy. This fact stems mostly from weak institutions, bad governance, election rigging, human rights violations, and foreign interference. This ‘legitimation crisis’ (Habermas, 1973) triggers political disaffection on the continent. Moreover, the ‘democratic deconsolidation’ (Howe, 2017) generates a general disillusionment. People are increasingly reluctant to participate in democratic systems. They feel a lack of a sense of belonging (Trudeau 2006). Confronted with the struggle over the desire of citizens to be heard, young people updated their ‘repertoire of collective action’ (Tilly, 1983) to express themselves.
In Kenya, young people protested against the Kenya Finance Bills with the hashtag #RejectFinanceBill2024. The so-called Gen Z protested online and in the street to express their discontent. They demanded that the president listen to them and withdraw the finance bill aimed at increasing taxes. The demonstrations paid off, as the president has given in to the demands of the younger generation. The #EndBadGovernanceInNigeria followed the same logic. Also in Nigeria, in Lagos, the #EndSARS campaign, a protest against police brutality.
What’s more, citizens sometimes envisage a military takeover. In 2021, with the coup in Mali, other places are ready to see the same thing happen in their country. The continent is plagued by a trend of insecurity and militarisation again, especially in the Sahel region. All these issues highlight a key problem: the role assigned to young people in governance. In Burkina Faso, this situation exemplifies the frustrations and backing among young people for the military government. The frustration is twofold. On the one hand, the provinces are against the capital, Ouagadougou: central state against non-central state. On the other, young people across the country are pitted against the elites, particularly the older generation supported by foreign agendas. This is why Captain Ibrahim Traoré’s accession to power at the age of 34 was facilitated by strong support from young people.
In Burkina Faso, the frustration is twofold. On the one hand, the provinces are against the capital, Ouagadougou: central state against non-central state. On the other, young people across the country are pitted against the elites, particularly the older generation supported by foreign agendas.
Beyond the popular enthusiasm, lies the issue of young people’s representation in decision-making bodies. The majority of the country’s population is young. These young people have rallied around the captain because they lack confidence in the older generation, whom they perceive as incapable of fulfilling their aspirations. ‘They believe that a young president has either lived through the same experiences or understands them thus, he would be able to articulate their aspirations. They resonate with him due to his age, his humble circumstances, and his political will for change,’ explains one of the people I spoke to in Bobo Dioulasso, the country’s second-largest city, 329 kilometres from the capital, in September 2023.
Young people are virtually non-existent in strategic spheres. Illiteracy, a lack of financial resources and the weakness of legislation, which is purely incentive-based without being binding, mean that young people do not have a satisfactory position in the country’s elite. The feeling of inequality in the enjoyment of economic and development opportunities is one of the major factors in the country’s multidimensional crisis. The people of Burkina Faso as a whole feel that a minority is monopolising the country’s wealth to the detriment of the masses, who are languishing in poverty. Young people feel that nothing is being done to enable them to make the most of the country’s potential. They feel that they are the most disadvantaged. They feel that their voice is not being heard. This support for the military government may, therefore, reflect the hope that their aspirations will be taken into account.
In the case of Togo, citizens’ strategy towards local institutions is a kind of “exit”, whereas elsewhere, citizens “voice” or adopt “loyalty” to appropriate Hirschman’s concept (Hirschman, 1970). According to a survey conducted by Afrobarometer on decentralisation in Togo in 2022:
- The majority of Togolese believe that decentralisation improves everyday life, but not their participation in political life.
- The majority of Togolese are not very involved in public life. Less than half of Togolese say they have attended at least one communal meeting (45%) or met other citizens to discuss a communal issue (41%) in the last 12 months.
- More than three-quarters (77%) of Togolese say they have never contacted a local councillor in the past year.
- Around nine out of 10 Togolese would like information such as communal council budgets and expenditure (87%) and tenders and contracts for state-funded projects (86%) to be made public.
It has to be said that the decentralisation reform in Togo is much more ambitious in terms of citizen participation than in other French-speaking countries in the sub-region. The project has set up a mechanism for listening to citizens. At the heart of the political system, governments feel the need to involve citizens in political decision-making within the system. In this case, political participation often goes smoothly. In the country, the Citizens’ Bureau is provided for by law. Most communes have waited for the ministerial decree specifying the operationalisation of the office. Even when the decree was signed, many local authorities had not yet set up the Citizens’ Bureau. However, with the help of German cooperation, 10 pilot communes were granted an exemption and tested this innovative democratic body.
The Citizen’s Bureau is a facilitator of territorial social cohesion, acting as an intermediary between elected representatives and citizens. It is a sort of ‘local mediator’ that works to achieve three main objectives. Firstly, it acts as a conduit for information about local life and as a forum for citizens to raise issues, so that managers can be held to account. In its accountability function, it is seen as a tool for citizen monitoring of public action. Secondly, it serves as a framework for consultation and concertation for citizens wishing to give their opinions and become involved in local management. Also, intended to be a crucible for decision-making, the Citizen’s Bureau should be used to the full for the co-production of public decision-making. In practice, however, while citizens can formulate collective inspirations and aspirations, their expertise as users remains to be fully exploited.
Three major lessons have emerged from the trial phase. Citizens have embraced the Citizens’ Advice Bureau as a tool and would like to see opening hours extended. As the Citizens’ Advice Bureau operates on a part-time basis for the most part, users feel the need for a stronger presence. In addition, the headquarters or office of this local mediation body should be housed in a third-party location and not at the town hall to ensure neutrality. Many citizens feel embarrassed to come to the town hall to complain about this body or ask about its management. Other communes can learn from these cases. After all, these localities have plenty of resources to draw on to strengthen local participatory innovations. Finally, as the municipality pays the Citizen’s Bureau coordinator, he or she attends municipal staff meetings.
For this reason, some people question his neutrality. By being hierarchically under the mayor, his role as a “local mediator” is altered in the eyes of others. It would be interesting to find a formula to guarantee his payment directly from the central government budget and give him a minimum of leeway about the municipal administration. As much as I asked people why they don’t engage with their local representatives, they say confidently there’s no good reason to do so. Because they don’t trust the process. The mechanism looks like a window dressing, and they wish more transparency in the management of the mechanism and its guidelines.
In many countries, while decentralisation is effective, citizen participation is ambiguous. No serious urban planning or good governance can take place without the people affected by policies. Anything done for citizens without them lacks legitimacy and is therefore done against them since they do not give their consent. This is the basic principle of democracy. It’s why democratic innovations matter. This concept of democratic innovations includes ‘institutions that have been specifically designed to increase and deepen citizen participation in the political decision-making process’ (Smith 2009: 2). Africa hosts long-time participation institutions, such as Kgotla in Botswana or Palaver Tree in West Africa. This tradition makes the setup of any consultations easier on the continent. The citizens should decide about the issues that affect their lives. The government must defer to their wisdom.
3. Local political arenas
To support citizens and improve their standard of living, sub-national governments need to build a territorial community in which citizen participation is the driving force. This means managing stakeholders, time and space. Local authorities need to be aware that overhauling the process requires political will and an in-depth analysis of the context to remove all obstacles before a meaningful process of democratic innovations can take place.
First and foremost, the local context is critical, which makes diagnosis essential. Who are the stakeholders? What principles govern the institutional organisation of political power at the sub-national level? These are quite limited areas, distinct from the central power of the State, in which identified political and administrative authorities operate. The nature, processes, competences and modes of action of these territorial entities, represented by institutions called ‘local authorities’, will be examined. Beyond the official distribution of authority, local political powers are regulated by other actors in the local public sphere. After outlining the contours of local political power as it is structured, according to the institutionalist approach, the aim will be to analyse local powers from relational or interactionist perspectives, particularly in the African context. Understanding the dynamics of decentralisation is essential for thinking about the architecture of citizen participation.
According to the anthropologists in the team led by Thomas Bierschenk and Jean Pierre Olivier de Sardan, local political arenas are becoming ‘polycephals’ (Bierschenk, T., and de Sardan, O., (ed.), 1998). In other words, a ‘stacking’ in a village of ‘centres of power and regulatory bodies, each with its own standards of legitimacy and its own political staff, with no real hierarchy’ between the old and new institutions, so they continue to regulate local political life. Scholars call these different structures ‘local political arenas’, understood as a ‘place for concrete confrontations between social actors interacting around common issues.’ Every time there is a change in the national central regime, local players emerge in new grassroots institutions. But the old players do not lose their legitimacy. In these areas, we can classify all the traditional and old elites. We, therefore, agree with the authors mentioned above that these arenas play a regulatory role in local political life. However, while their existence enables local people to use ‘institution shopping’ to settle local conflicts, it cannot be said that there is no hierarchy between these ‘local institutions’. Ultimately, the legality of the political power in place always takes precedence over other institutions, even if the ‘Africa of compromise’ always wants to find an amicable solution to social differences. Disputes that cannot be resolved amicably in these arenas end up back on the table of the incumbent political power. However, their application is likely to pose problems in terms of legitimacy, mainly in land issues.
The other essential aspect concerns local tribal or ethnic minorities. Some try to exclude them from the democratic process. Even if the rivalry between ‘natives’ and ‘foreigners’ has calmed down, it is not always easy to manage and remains a serious problem (Geschiere 2009). Many people fall into the trap of ‘autochthony’ and try to pit ‘true natives’ against ‘false natives’ when it comes to citizenship. Although this is not new and is specific to Africa, some claim to have been ‘born on the land’ and exclude others from the right to claim citizenship. In times of political crisis, others become the scapegoats responsible for all the ills. In so doing, those who practise this defeat of the national community feel they are better citizens than others. This pride can have serious consequences. Whether they are problems or potential problems, it will be useful to give community leaders the means to live together and avoid any problems or feelings of division. Peace between tribes or cultures is essential to the implementation of participatory processes. Intercultural communication skills can help to deter attempts at division.
Those in charge are not necessarily those who have the power to decide or who do decide effectively.
Another problem is to examine how powers are distributed between central and sub-national governments. We need to analyse the powers transferred and the balance of power between central civil servants at the local level and decentralised elected representatives to find out who the real decision-makers are. The institutional approach has its limits because those in charge are not necessarily those who have the power to decide or who do decide effectively. As Lucien Sfez put it, the ‘myth of the decision’ describes this complex dynamic beyond decisions and informal power (Sfez 1992).
It should also be noted that the central government would encroach on the prerogatives of local authorities or would officially overturn laws acquired by local authorities. As in Benin, the management autonomy of mayors has been subtly challenged, and the law has been amended to allow the appointment of an executive secretary in charge of local public procurement by the central government. In this way, citizens can not hold their representatives to account for the procurement process. One wonders why governments make such decisions. The source close to the central government claims that it is to avoid corruption in transactions. However, some of the newly appointed officials have been implicated in procurement fraud or financial scandals in the awarding of contracts. To avoid such attempts or suspicions, public action must involve citizens by setting up tools for transparency and inclusion.
4. Free spaces for citizen deliberation
As political disengagement grows, democratic innovations can help foster a sense of belonging among citizens, promote participation, and reignite civic culture, as well as more democratic inclusivity with young people, women, minorities, and the disabled, in the interests of the political community. Democracy is more than just voting. For democracy to thrive, we need democracy, not for citizens but with citizens. It actively imagines innovative mechanisms of political participation and collective intelligence to find workable solutions for the common good. Enhancing democracy in Africa can foster citizen engagement in their communities as well as in local and regional areas. How can we connect citizens’ views from the bottom up? How can they challenge the existing narratives and find practical ideas that align with people’s will? How do the solutions have an impact and improve their daily lives? How do we get citizens into democracy? How can grassroots democracy flourish?
Traditional liberal democracy, with its elections and representatives, does not take sufficient account of the perspectives and experiences of ordinary citizens, particularly women, young people, ethnic minorities, and people with disabilities. What’s more, some citizens are disenfranchised in a hidden way and do not participate in any public engagement. Daniel Gaxie calls this ‘hidden cens,’ a sort of hidden disenfranchisement, which means that they refrain from participating in political life. Yet, there is nothing in the law to prevent them from doing so ( Gaxie 1978).
This is where democratic innovations emerge as a powerful tool for reversing the trend. The crucial question is: what is the difference between these new practices and traditional modes of political participation? Broadly speaking, it covers all processes and practices beyond elections, political parties and interest group activism. To design it at the grassroots level, Africans have existing models that can be improved, such as Palaver three or Kgotla. In addition, they can opt for new practices by putting their ‘ideas into action’ (Newton 2012: 5).
Concrete empirical design needs to study social myths, collective imaginaries, and the weight of tradition and cultural factors.
Successful strategies must be based on local realities. Otherwise, they will not be impactful. Concrete empirical design needs to study social myths, collective imaginaries, and the weight of tradition and cultural factors. To flesh out these naked ideas, the local solution is to create a safe space for citizens’ deliberation at two levels: the autonomous space and the crucible. At the first level, autonomous spaces are anchored around women, young people and the elderly. At the second, the crucible, the ‘melting pot’, opens to everybody.
In the first stage, the ‘safe citizens’ space of deliberation is an independent zone for women, young people and seniors. Everyone is free to join the space where they feel comfortable. For example, young women can join the women’s group or the youth group, while young men can join the seniors’ group if they think they belong to this section. In fact, in many African societies, women and young people are still considered to be ‘cadets sociaux’ or ‘social youths’ and do not have the ‘right to speak’ in the strict sense of the term, but to a normal extent, they do not have the ‘right to challenge the eldest or the men’. There’s a kind of self-censorship to avoid the throes of social control. Balandier describes the ‘automatic organisation of authority’ as being based on ‘seniority’ (Balandier 1955: 340). Every group can debate and make their choice freely, without social weight. Participants discuss different perspectives and can put forward their ideas for the local agenda. The peer-to-peer settings can also be helpful for peer-to-peer learning regarding social issues and political decision-making.
At the second level, the ‘melting pot’ phase, all the groups can meet. Young people and women can then express themselves because they have already integrated clear ideas after debating them within the peer group. Even if there are sub-titled hierarchies of power, some of the ‘social youth’ will report the broad outlines of the decision as spokespersons without offending the elders. At least the process is inclusive. In principle, at this stage, the guidelines of open dialogue, open space and community consensus prevail, as they did at the previous stage. The meeting point is also designed as a civic space, a place where they can be educated about civic culture, political processes, and citizens’ rights.
In my view, all local policy initiatives should be discussed before being implemented by policymakers. In some countries, such as Kenya and Botswana, public hearings and consultations are held to gather feedback on proposed policies and projects. Especially local governments should increase access to citizens at every stage of the process: conceived, developed, delivered, and evaluated. To put flesh on these borne ideas, transparency is the main thread for fruitful citizen engagement. Instead of organising just a tokenism meeting with citizens, what I call a ‘town crier space’ to inform citizens on what they have done, government representatives gain trust by enrolling citizens at an early stage. The constituents are calling for a democratic public sphere where they can exercise their right to hold their representatives accountable. It is this experience of ‘transparent democracy,’ based on accountability, that local citizens need to build a territorial identity, the spearhead of development.
5. Public territorial innovation
In the context of globalisation and competitiveness, territorial identity serves as an asset for the region’s attractiveness and development. Policymaking that involves citizens generates this kind of impact. ‘Territorial identity’ refers to a sense of belonging to a specific territory, emanating from the collective feeling of similarity among the members of this ‘imagined community’ (Risse 2002). This sense of identity fosters loyalty to a community, creating a convergence of individual and collective interests, which forms the foundation of an attachment to the area. Effective policies carried out with the consent of citizens nurture and strengthen territorial identity.
‘More directly, normative actions can feed a local sense of belonging when they are in favour of needs that are also recognised by the local community as crucial needs. An important normative field where these reflections should be taken into consideration is represented by cohesion policies. When such policies are devoted to real needs and in a way that citizens recognise as important for their own private interests, they do not only achieve higher effectiveness, as recently witnessed but participate in the construction of a territorial identity and, through it, local competitiveness.’ (Capello 2019).
Overall, local identity drives public territorial innovation. This involves connecting local players—citizens, the public sector, and the private sector—and harnessing their energies, either directly or through technology, to leverage the benefits of collective intelligence in a specific area. One might argue that innovation represents a new solution to a problem that needs addressing within a particular territory. The proposed solution must be sustainable and effective. Consequently, innovation necessitates adaptation to the local context, as well as the co-construction of responses and mobilisation of resources by those “concerned”: the stakeholders.
Territorial transformation cannot flourish without the involvement of citizens, businesses and local authorities. To achieve this, local authorities, in their drive for innovation, need the support of professionals capable of putting the cursor on the real challenges at stake. This can be achieved through education to instil a genuine culture of change. On the one hand, the staff of town halls and elected representatives do not have all the skills required to master the real aspirations and needs of the local population. On the other hand, citizens who want to play a part in the development of their area are wary, or although they have some good ideas, they don’t feel that they belong locally, or they don’t have the necessary resources to bring their ideas to fruition.
An association between those who decide, those who have the ideas and those who have the resources can only increase the attractiveness and development of the territory. Introducing forms of collective participation can only strengthen local governance and the culture of innovation and participation. This involves equipping citizens, civil society, elected representatives and municipal staff. The aim is to tap into collective intelligence, collective wisdom for creativity and ideas, as well as the information and knowledge held by the masses, in this case, the citizens. Consultation and hearing processes of the stakeholders require careful handling. This has the merit of avoiding bias and respecting the appropriate stages to obtain relevant and convincing results. In addition, crowdsourcing is a way of gaining information from the masses. It offers a decisive avenue for innovation, with new ideas coming from a large number of people.
Researchers such as Lukensmeyer and Torres speak of ‘citizen sourcing”, arguing that citizens will be the new sources of expertise for the success of all phases of public policy design (Lukensmeyer and Torres 2008). User expertise saves time and money and ensures the success of projects because the real beneficiaries take ownership of them from the outset. In this way, the political, climatic, economic and social challenges and issues facing local areas can be filtered through innovation and real solutions found, translated into actions and measures for the ecological transition, the digital transition, participatory democracy, solidarity and prevention. The real winner is everyone. The whole chain is relieved. Elected representatives and town hall employees will have more time to deal with other priorities and, above all, better manage their stress and pressure from all sides.
The user-citizen experience will be improved, and services will be made easier. Elected representatives will be able to fulfil their development objectives more easily by promoting a more attractive area for easier financial support. The stakes of public innovation are high for the region: transparency, inclusion and efficiency. Ultimately, new grassroots development solutions necessarily call for a new culture of internal change, the involvement of the user-citizen in the process, and the appropriation of projects by private partners who provide the technology and funding. Territorial public innovation is a powerful driver of local or regional attractiveness and development. It is through this prism that territorial public intelligence software will be designed.
6. Citizen-led development and its impact
Citizen participation should be central to political management at the local level, and some local authorities recognise this. For example, in Nigeria, decentralisation reform has prompted politicians to consider citizens’ preferences when allocating funds for public goods and to heed their wishes in areas such as education, health, infrastructure, and agriculture, as they have acknowledged the significant impact of public policies that are oriented towards citizens. (Bunte and Kim 2017).
Policies and services developed in collaboration with citizens are rational choices that provide a sense of ownership, good governance, sustainable development and consensus democracy but are not limited to these assets.
If citizens do not assume a leading role, local representatives cannot effectively address their challenges. We have already explained how sound policies and services, with citizen consent, nurture and bolster territorial identity while promoting local democracy. In addition, policies and services developed in collaboration with citizens are rational choices that provide a sense of ownership, good governance, sustainable development and consensus democracy but are not limited to these assets.
- Sense of ownership. The expertise of citizens makes it possible to obtain precise information on the urgent needs or issues of greatest concern to them. Who knows better than a beneficiary what they need? The answer is obvious. Citizen-user expertise is the knowledge and participation of citizens in the development of public services. Traditionally, citizen expertise has included ‘local knowledge’, ‘service user participation’ and ‘citizen science’ (Krick 2021). Instead of spending too much money hiring experts, sometimes from abroad, who know nothing about local values and realities, consulting those who are affected by the problems or who need to be affected saves time, improves efficiency and makes local government more relevant. “Being involved makes you feel concerned about the problems in the community – and pushes you to have a positive social impact.” UN. This ensures that the beneficiaries take ownership of the decisions, with other effects such as a sense of belonging to the community, social cohesion, solidarity, similarity, local citizenship and territory identity.
- Consensus democracy. Democratic consensus values the inclusion of all social groups at all stages of decision-making on public policies, services and programmes. The impact is the adaptation of democracy to African values. Decisions in Africa are taken by consensus, consultation and dialogue. The arithmetical majority associated with voting generates frustration among minority groups. Thus, no one feels defeated, beaten or dejected. Democracy is built on tolerance and compromise and becomes stable when the players integrate it as a viable solution. That’s what makes democracy ‘the only game in town’ ( Przeworski 1991: 26).
- Good governance. Corruption is the main scourge of politics and administration in Africa. By opening up public documents and all levels of the process to citizens, monitoring and evaluation reduce the opportunities for corruption. The level of transparency and control reduces the level of corruption. The impact of participatory democracy and open government mechanisms fosters a climate of good governance. Transparency, accountability and reduced corruption mean higher revenues for governments and higher taxes easily paid by citizens because they know the ‘bottom of the pot’. As the African saying goes, ‘You have to lift the lid on the pot to find out what’s boiling inside.’ Good governance is one of the objectives of decentralisation as a driver of prosperity and stability for sustainable development.
- Sustainable development. According to the World Commission on Environment and Development (1987), it is ‘development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.’ Despite the call to end poverty by 2030, the major challenges remain in Sub-Saharan Africa. By bringing all citizens together around the table, they strive to accelerate development based on shared prosperity among themselves and with the Earth’s current and future inhabitants. At a time of climate change, the impact of working together means that we can live today without compromising nature. Raising awareness of selective waste sorting enables local governments to have an impact in terms of development and ecology. More understanding and support for projects, less incivility, more use of infrastructure and public services, better quality of service, and sustainable development. In Mali in 2006, a ‘citizens’ jury on genetically modified cotton as a democratic innovation’ called for the suspension of legislation authorising genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in the country (Curato 2023: 184).
Conclusion
This work seeks to demonstrate the impact of public policies developed in collaboration with the beneficiaries: the citizens. It draws on collective imaginaries to propose safe democratic spaces within African contexts. Greater citizen participation can lower the threshold of this poor governance and the limits of decentralised reform. To address the democratic deficit, especially at the grassroots level, local authorities need to engage people from all walks of life more deeply in every stage of the policy-making process. Local solutions promote sustainable and inclusive local development. Democracy remains the ‘government of the people, by the people, for the people,’ as Abraham Lincoln articulated. In their operations, local institutions replicate the flaws that undermine administration at the national level: bureaucracy, corruption, cronyism, opaque management, and so forth. The battle for local political power transforms into a struggle for wealth, much like in the central state apparatus, embodying a ‘politics of the belly’ (Bayart 1993).
Despite the constitutional and political gaps that hinder the proper representation of citizens, it is evident that the social conformism of subaltern groups is evolving. Kenya’s Gen-Z movement captivates with its emphasis on emancipation and the new imaginaries it promotes. Young people are at the forefront of protest, even amidst crackdowns and abductions. They have mobilised their efforts independently, without any financial backing. Fueled by ‘hustler capital’, the youth are reshaping the Kenyan political landscape and offering fresh perspectives on citizenship and political participation in the country. It can be inferred that Gen-Z has voiced its opinions and recognised its power to engage in the public sphere, which is remarkable because it operates outside the confines of political parties, tribes, or leaders—heralding a new era in the nation’s political landscape. Through these liberated, democratic spaces of subaltern groups, free from the constraints of dominant groups, alternative ideas can flourish. Absent the consent of the marginalised, power will inevitably erode its hegemony (Gramsci). Coercion alone is not enough to maintain the cultural norms of domination that subjugate women and young people. The future of democracy in Africa undoubtedly hinges on the ‘collective will’ of these subaltern masses who are redefining the social and political order.
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